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The intent of this thesis is to explore the perceived discrepancies between individual scores 
of psychopathy, particularly the division of primary and secondary psychopathy, and how such 
scores may moderate the relationship of one's emotional experiences with the corresponding 
emotional expression.  There is evidence to consider that a person's working memory ability and/or 
volitional suppression of expression may also moderate this relationship and result in constricted 
emotional expression, a trait often found in primary psychopathy. Undergraduate participants 
completed the study online, and after exclusions, a final sample size of 126 participants (62.7% 
women) was used in analyses. An initial linear regression found that primary psychopathy severity 
showed a negative relationship with performance on a visuo-spatial n-back test of working 
memory. While age did not relate to expression, women reported a greater strength of expression 
for both negative and positive emotions than men. Using hierarchical linear regressions, a 
significant four-way interaction was found between primary psychopathy severity, working 
memory performance, degree of volitional expression suppression, and internal emotional 
experience, in predicting the strength of expressing negative emotions. Analysis of simple effects 
revealed that, for participants scoring higher in primary psychopathy (n = 63), there was a 
significant three-way interaction for experience of negative emotions, the use of emotional 
suppression, and working memory performance in predicting the strength of expressing negative 
emotions. Simple effects of this interaction showed that for a subgroup who were higher in primary 
psychopathy and volitional suppression of emotional expression (n = 25), there was significant 
negative relationship between the frequency of experiencing negative emotions and the strength 
of expressing those emotions. There were no significant interactions involving secondary 
 ii 
psychopathy severity or variables relating to positive emotions in any regression. The findings of 
this study could be useful for future research on psychopathy as it relates to understanding the 
characteristics and functioning of individuals with psychopathy.   
 iii 
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A line of existing research has examined mediators of the connection between innate 
emotional experience and outward signs of emotional expressivity. However, there does not 
appear to be published research on this topic in individuals with either categorical or dimensional 
psychopathy. In research on other psychopathologies, researchers have found various ways to 
explain a disconnect between internal emotional reactivity and a blunted external emotional 
response. For example, limits to executive functioning capabilities (e.g., working memory) and 
one’s cognitive workload has been found to impede the ability for inward emotion to be 
externally expressed (reviewed below). Other researchers examine the extent to which 
individuals utilize emotional suppression that, as discussed below, allows one to intentionally 
suppress the expression of emotion (e.g., facial expression, vocal acoustic), even though one may 
internally experience the emotion. The purpose of the current study is to examine the connection 
between emotional experience and subsequent emotional expression in relation to dimensional 
psychopathy factors along with other potential mediators, including level of emotional 
suppression and working memory functioning. 
Psychopathy or psychopathic personality is a construct that subsumes a myriad of 
features, to include: superficial and insincere interpersonal relations, lack of empathy and 
remorse, pervasive antisocial behavior, and impulsivity that often leads to delinquent behaviors 
(Hare, 2003). In its extreme form, psychopathy is believed to affect approximately one- to two 
percent of the general population; however, this accumulates to an estimate of fifty-percent of 
violent offenders (Rutter, 2012; Lösel, 2001; Dolan & Doyle, 2000). Consistent with such 
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findings, individuals with higher levels of psychopathic traits are associated with an above-
average number of recorded criminal offenses and such a diagnosis is a principal factor in 
predicting future violence, serious transgressions, and recidivism (Künecke, Mokros, Olderbak, 
& Wilhelm, 2018; Dhingra & Boduszek, 2013). Studying the etiological basis and subsequent 
ramifications of antisocial behavior have led researchers to focus primarily on antisocial 
personality disorder (APD) and psychopathy (Vaidyanathan et al., 2011). APD is a personality 
disorder found within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; 
American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013), whereas psychopathy is a personality construct 
created by Cleckley (1941). Although both share several standard features, APD and 
psychopathy are distinct in many ways. 
Whereas both constructs include a persistent antisocial deviancy originating in childhood 
and pervading into adulthood, psychopathy is distinct insofar that it features a deficit in 
emotional attributes and characteristics. Coid and Ullrich (2010) pertinently wrote that 
psychopathy might be the extreme form of APD in which it has distinguishing features (e.g., 
affective interpersonal traits). Contemporary conceptualizations of psychopathy originated with 
Cleckley's (1941) "The Mask of Sanity," which delineated sixteen specific criteria for the 
psychopathic disorder that incorporated interpersonal and affective characteristics. The 
encompassment of such features includes information that has been absent in diagnostic criteria 
APD; thus, raising criticism for its functionality and generalizability. Though psychopathy has 
conventionally been defined as a unitary taxon, recent research posits that its recognizable 
features allow it to be defined using two underlying factors (Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld, & 
Pythress, 2006; Murrie et al., 2007; Walters, Duncan, & Mitchell-Perez, 2007; Coid & Yang, 
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2008). The first factor (factor one) encompasses issues that reflect the core of interpersonal and 
affective features emphasized by Cleckley and the second factor being used to describe 
behaviors reflecting a deviant and impulsive lifestyle (Hare et al., 1991). Factor one and factor 
two are frequently referred to as primary and secondary psychopathy, respectively. The division 
of Cleckley's original sixteen criteria constructs into two factors allows research to examine 
psychopathy in a community sample as opposed to limiting research to psychopathy within 
violent offenders and prison inmates (Sellbom & Verona, 2007). This particular method of 
studying psychopathy reverses the traditional way in which it was defined categorically and 
allows for dimensional usage; thus, permitting researchers to study beyond psychopathy as a 
dichotomy and enable individuals to be placed and examined on a spectrum. 
To evaluate psychopathy, a multitude of empirical articles have used and, in turn, 
established the psychometric validity and reliability of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-
R; Olver & Wong, 2015; McCuish et al., 2015; Forth & Mailloux, 2000; Salekin et al., 1997). 
The PCL-R measurement of psychopathy is, by many researchers, considered the gold-standard 
for measuring the trait whereby short-versions and related tests often establish associations to the 
original source. However, there have been ongoing debates on which traits are crucial and 
indispensable to the construct. For some, the two factor model from the PCL-R is pertinent to the 
success of studying the trait (Harpur & Hare, 1989; Boduszek & Debowska, 2016; Rice & 
Harris, 1995; Khiroya et al., 2009), whereas, for other researchers, a competing three-factor 
model is preferred (Patrick, 2010). For this, researchers developed a triarchic model (Cooke & 
Michie, 2001) and a subsequent self-report scale, the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM; 
Patrick 2010; Patrick et al., 2009; Patrick & Drislane, 2015; Roy et al., 2020) which produces 
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factor scores for Boldness, Meanness, and Disinhibition. A smaller group of researchers prefer a 
four-factor model (e.g., interpersonal, affective, lifestyle, and antisocial; Vitacco et al., 2008; 
Hare & Neumann, 2006).  
The absence of a conceptual and inherent consensus concerning which approach is most 
effective has led to research that examines the advantages and effectiveness of assessing 
psychopathy with models and related scales ranging from two to four factors (Tsang et al., 2018). 
In one study, Cooke and Sellbom (2019) discovered that four-factor models had less consistent 
support as opposed to a three-factor model. Such findings are further corroborated by other 
studies finding inconsistencies in the four-factor model of psychopathy (Boduszek & Debowska, 
2016; Cooke et al. 2007). Concerning the use of a two-factor or three-factor model, researchers 
have been unable to reach a consensus as to which model is more valid for studying psychopathy 
(Tsang et al., 2018). However, some researchers frequently describe the three-factor model as 
overlooking and, thus, excluding a factor score specific to antisocial and criminal behavior 
(Boduszek & Debowska, 2016). A number of psychopathy researchers have argued that 
inclusion of a specific antisocial facet score (i.e., secondary psychopathy) is an integral and 
fundamental part in the measurement of psychopathy (Boduszek & Debowska, 2016; Skeem & 
Cooke, 2010). While a two-factor model is also not without limitations (e.g., Kosson et al., 1990; 
Salekin et al., 1997), instruments assessing psychopathy with a two-factor model have been 
substantiated and recommended in studying primary and secondary psychopathy, respectively 
(Tsang et al., 2018).  
It is proposed that the PCL model constitutes one latent entity that is subsequently made 
up of correlated traits. Two-factor models were constructed to assess psychopathic traits within 
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community samples, including the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP), the 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), and the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI-SF). 
In using such models and scales, researchers study psychopathy as a two-factor construct with 
each factor representing distinct personality and behavioral features. Factor one, often called 
interpersonal/affective, and factor two, frequently identified as antisocial, have an average 
intercorrelation of .50 across studies (Harpur et al.,1988). For this study, in particular, it is 
necessary for the researchers to select a self-report scale that can provide a score for the primary 
factor that, as discussed below, represents the interpersonal and emotional aspect of 
psychopathy. 
 A frequently used instrument, based on the two-factor model, is the LSRP, a twenty-six 
item self-report scale developed to study psychopathy with noninstitutionalized samples 
(Levenson et al., 1995). Since publication, there has been an abundance of researchers finding 
correlations between the LSRP and psychopathy (as measured by the PCL-R) thereby supporting 
the scale’s use in psychopathy research (Kelsey et al., 2014; Garofalo et al., 2018; Tsang et al., 
2018). An advantage to using the LSRP to assess individual differences in a community 
population is that there is no explicit reference to antisocial behavior; this, as a result, has made it 
more useful and reliable in studying antisocial behavior without there being contamination of the 
results due to differentiating characteristics (e.g., criterion differences, skewed data as a result of 
a community population; Garofalo et al., 2019). This indirect reference to antisocial behavior 
prevents excessively skewed data in community samples due to negligible variation of these 
behaviors (Garofalo et al., 2018). In addition to this, studies show that the LSRP is more apt and 
effective in differentiating and studying the primary, or interpersonal/affective, factor of 
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psychopathy (Garofalo et al., 2018). The division of the latent factors and an emphasis on 
primary psychopathy, as stated above, are significant components for this current paper; as such, 
the selection of a measure with added emphasis or a more accurate depiction of primary 
psychopathy characteristics is warranted. 
The PAI and PPI-SF are additional designs that examine psychopathy based on a two-
factor approach. The PAI is a multiscale, in particular, eleven scale self-report instrument that is 
designed in such a way as to analyze a myriad of psychopathological constructs (Morey, 1991). 
The Antisocial Features Scale (ANT) pertains to items representing antisocial behaviors, 
criminality, and psychopathy (Morey, 1991). Among an offending population, the PAI-ANT was 
positively associated with the total PCL-R score, this however, was qualified insofar that the 
scores pertained mostly to the antisocial and lifestyle factor (Tsang et al., 2018). With this in 
mind, the PAI-ANT’s emphasized placement on the secondary latent factors is not considered 
prudent for this study in which the researchers are directing more attention to the interpersonal 
attributes of psychopathy. Constructed by Lilienfeld (1990), the PPI was, again, constructed in 
such a way as to examine psychopathy characteristics in nonclinical samples. The PPI is a one-
hundred-and-eighty-seven (187) self-report measures assessing eight factor-analytically 
developed domains (Lilienfeld, 1990). By further analysis, an abbreviated, fifty-six (56) item 
(PPI-SF) was constructed that demonstrated that the eight domains could be combined into two 
higher-order dimensions (Lilienfeld, 1990). The two-factor structure of the PPI-SF, however, 
have not always been consistent, there are concerns that have been raised regarding the item 
selection process and that latent traits of the PCL-R may be underrepresented (Lilienfeld, 1990; 
Wilson et al., 2011; Benning et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2011). With this, issuing participants with 
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an extensive psychopathic measure, along with additional batteries used for the purposes of this 
research, seemed unfeasible and unwarranted.  
Collectively, two-factor models were constructed to provide more effective measures to 
study psychopathy outside of the criminal justice system. There is consistent evidence to suggest 
that psychopathic traits are distributed within a healthy and non-institutionalized community 
sample (Salekin, 2016; Lilienfeld et al., 2014; Garofalo et al., 2018); as such, self-report 
comparisons to the PCL-R is essential. The assessment and scoring of the PCL-R requires 
extensive training, a thorough interview with the participant(s), obtaining supplementary 
information from collaterals, and clinical experience (Garofalo et al., 2018). Due to such time-
invested requirements, two-factor models of psychopathy may be administered to situations (e.g., 
college students) in which issuing the PCL-R is impractical and ultimately, unfeasible.  
As previously mentioned, the PCL model of psychopathy is composed of one latent entity 
that is subsequently constructed via the identification of two correlated traits. Each factor 
represents distinct personality and behavioral characteristics: factor one, frequently called 
interpersonal/affective, and factor two, commonly referred to as antisocial. For example, factor 
one encompasses a vast number of personality traits that most researchers consider to be at the 
core of psychopathy (Harpur et al., 1989; Kreis et al., 2012; Miller, & Lynam, 2001). In the 
LSRP, interpersonal/affective items concern emotional impressions and one's interpersonal 
processes and ability (Vaidyanathan et al., 2011). Such items are characterized by superficial 
charm, narcissism, grandiose sense of self-worth, habitual and pathological lying, lack of 
sincerity, lack of affect and emotional depth, callousness and lack of empathy, and failure to take 
responsibility for personal actions (Hare et al., 1990). Factor two, although correlated with the 
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latter factor, has personality traits that make it distinct, including impulsivity and antisocial 
behaviors (Dawel et al., 2019). Factor two comprises of general antisocial deviance, to include, 
low frustration tolerance, a parasitic lifestyle, impulsivity, early behavioral problems, juvenile 
delinquency, general irresponsible behavior, proneness to committing many criminal offenses, 
and a high probability of criminal recidivism (Hare et al., 1990). 
Of particular interest for this paper is the notion of shallow affect, which is one of the 
traits associated with primary psychopathy (Marsh, 2013; Murrie et al., 2012). Otherwise known 
as blunted or constricted affect, this feature is considered a type of negative symptom which also 
appears in several psychiatric disorders (Strauss & Cohen, 2017). Blunted affect can present as a 
reduction in the typical outward expression of emotions in a number of distinct ways: facial 
expression, vocal expression, or body gestures (Strauss and Cohen, 2017). While there has been 
a large body of research on the experience of emotion in psychopathy, primarily regarding fear, 
there is relatively little research that examines blunted emotional expression. A better 
understanding of the basis, features, and moderators of blunted expressed affect will contribute 
important novel information to existing knowledge regarding the personality construct of 
psychopathy. For example, the current study will examine blunted affect as it pertains to a 
possible disconnect between one’s internal emotional reaction to a positively or negatively-
charged stimuli. With this, the study of potential mediators or the amalgamation of mediators to 
explain the disconnect is pertinent to study.  
Scientists have thoroughly researched autonomic nervous system arousal responses, 
which reflect subjective emotional experience, to fear stimuli in relation to psychopathy 
(Cleckley, 1941; Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016; Fanti et al., 2017; Benning et al., 2005; 
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Vaidyanathan et al., 2011). These studies consistently find that individuals scoring higher than 
controls on psychopathic measures tend to show blunted physiological arousal to fear stimuli 
(Thomson et al., 2019). Such findings have been based on a wide range of measures of 
autonomic activity (e.g., skin conductance, heart rate, eye blink startle-reflex, pupillometry). The 
physiological arousal to emotionally-aversive stimuli seems to show an inverse relationship 
between primary and secondary psychopathy. For example, Patrick (1994) documented that 
reductions in emotional reactivity are found almost exclusively in individuals with relatively 
high scores on factor 1. The "antisocial behavior" component is correlated with fearfulness, 
emotional dysregulation, and higher levels of distress (Patrick, 1994). Consistent with such 
findings, a meta-analysis conducted by Lorber (2004) recorded an inverse relationship between 
facets while using skin conductance measures. Reduced physiological responses to threat stimuli 
in individuals scoring high on factor two has been sporadically found or ubiquitously absent 
(Lorber, 2004; Kyranides et al., 2017; Fanti et al., 2017; López et al., 2013). Such results also 
provide underlying support for psychopathy to be viewed as a dichotomous construct as opposed 
to a single taxon. 
Regarding emotional experience (e.g., autonomic reactivity and subjective-reports of 
emotional experience) and emotional expression (e.g., facial responsiveness), the prevailing 
model of emotion uses valence and arousal dimensions to categorize and measure features of 
different emotions (Russell, 1980; Russell & Barret; 1999; Nummenmaa & Tuominen, 2018). 
Valence refers to the subjective appraisal of emotion-evoking stimuli on a bipolar unpleasant to 
pleasant scale (Russell and Barret; 1999; Nummenmaa & Tuominen, 2018). Analogous to 
valence, arousal refers to a continuous dimension in which it relates to the intensity of 
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experienced emotions from low to high (Russell, 1980; 1999; Nummenmaa & Tuominen, 2018). 
Using this model, emotions can be placed on a particular quadrant with distinguishing underlying 
features. For example, surprise has a relatively neutral valence with high arousal, whereas 
disgust has negative valence and low arousal (Jääskeläinen, 2019). 
The literature is relatively consistent that decreased fear relates to primary psychopathy, 
while increased fear relates to secondary psychopathy. However, the inherent emotional 
experience of individuals scoring high on psychopathic measures in response to stimuli evoking 
emotions other than fear remains a point of contention (e.g., happiness, sadness, anger). For 
example, when told to anticipate emotionally-arousing images, Blair et al. (1997) found that 
individuals with psychopathic traits, as measured by the PCL-R, when compared to their non-
psychopathic counterparts, had reduced autonomic responses to distressing stimuli (e.g., pictures 
of a group of crying adults, a screaming boy holding onto a railing). Other studies reported that 
individuals with psychopathy, divided into groups (e.g., high psychopathic scores, low 
psychopathic scores, and a mixed group) and examined based on a two-factor model, showed 
reduced autonomic responses across all emotion categories of pictures that were presented 
(Kilmonis et al., 2017; Patrick et al., 1993; Burley et al., 2017; Levenston et al., 2000; Herpetz et 
al., 2001). This is consistent with Hare's descriptions that individuals with psychopathy do not 
sufficiently process emotionally evocative stimuli and events (1970). In contrast to these 
replicated findings, one study found that psychopathic individuals, whether studied by primary or 
secondary psychopathy or as a unitary model, had an increase, rather than decrease, in autonomic 
arousal to both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli relative to neutral stimuli (Carmen Pastor et al., 
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2003). In contrast to previous studies, this study separated primary and secondary psychopathy 
and found that both displayed an increase in physiological arousal (Carmen Pastor et al., 2003).   
Researchers sometimes measure subjective emotional experience related to psychopathy 
with self-report scales rather than physiological measures. Patrick et al. (1993) found that 
individuals with psychopathy reported normal levels of experience to emotionally-evocative 
images, equal to the experience of the healthy control group. As opposed to neutral images, 
people with high scores on psychopathy, whether primary or secondary, rate pictures just as 
pleasing or as negative as that of a healthy sample (Carmen Pastor et al., 2003; Verona et al., 
2004). Similar to physiological devices designed to measure emotional experience, self-report 
scales indicate that both individuals with high total psychopathy and dimensional scores, and 
healthy controls find emotional pictures more arousing than neutral ones (Carmen Pastor et al., 
2003; Verona et al., 2004, Patrick et al., 1993).   
There has been relatively less research conducted on the relationship of level of blunted 
emotional expressiveness and psychopathy. Researchers generally agree that individuals with a 
psychopathic personality have constricted expressed affect (Hare, 1970; Marsh, 2013; Rimé, 
1978). Facial electromyography (EMG) is sometimes used as a method to examine the amount of 
facial expression. Changes in facial EMG over the corrugator muscles is associated with 
negatively-valenced expressions, while EMG changes over the zygomatic muscles is linked to 
positively-valenced expressions (Van Boxtel, 2010). In one of the few studies on this topic, Fanti 
et al. (2016) found that adolescents who scored higher on callous-unemotional (CU) traits (i.e., 
primary psychopathy) showed reduced facial electromyography voltage at the corrugator muscle 
(i.e., less negative facial expression) in response to videos representing all valence categories 
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(i.e., violent scenes, comedy scenes, and neutral scenes). Fanti et al. (2016) considered the role of 
the zygomatic muscle and showed that compared to a healthy control group, adolescents scoring 
higher on CU traits showed limited facial responses to presented stimuli. Deficits in the 
emotional expression of psychopathic individuals are further substantiated by De Wied et al. 
(2012), which found that adolescents scoring high on CU traits showed reduced zygomatic and 
corrugator muscle responses to emotionally-evocative stimuli. Reduced facial expression in 
people with high levels of general psychopathy, and not subtypes, has also been reported in an 
additional study in which researchers found a diminished facial expression to picture and facial 
stimuli (Hagenmuller et al., 2012). 
Although there is a theory that individuals scoring high on measures of psychopathy have 
diminished emotional expression, there are research findings that challenge this idea. For 
example, in one study there was no difference in how a healthy sample and people with 
psychopathy responded in their facial expression to different forms of emotions (i.e., anger, 
happiness, and sadness) conveyed to them by pictures (Künecke et al., 2018). De Wied et al. 
(2006) found that younger individuals, when scoring higher on CU scales, showed less facial 
mimicry in response to viewing only angry facial expressions. Herpetz et al. (2001) found that 
individuals with psychopathy exhibited less facial expressivity to both positive and negative 
emotionally-arousing valence images. This lack of expressivity may be a natural automated 
result of reduced internal emotional experience in response to emotionally-valanced stimuli. 
Alternatively, the relationship between emotional experience and emotional expression may be 
decoupled, with reduced expression relative to internal experience. Theoretically, this may result 
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from one of more moderators (i.e., primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy, executive 
functioning, or expression suppression), as discussed below.  
As mentioned above, one theory to explain decoupling of emotional experience and 
expressivity is that individuals with reduced executive functioning ability may experience a 
disconnect between inner experience and an outward expression of emotion (Cohen et al., 2012). 
That is, due to a lower capacity of utilizing cognitive resources in the moment, the motor 
response responsible for creating an outward expression of emotion is inhibited. In this model, 
the subjective experience of the emotion is relatively intact, but the expression of that emotion is 
blunted by the reduced cognitive capacity (Cohen et al., 2012). This theory was supported by 
data showing that schizotypal participants, when compared to their baseline, had expressivity 
reductions when engaged in executive functioning tasks, in particular, working memory tasks 
(Cohen, 2012). To date, it does not appear that there is an existing body of research that has 
directly examined this model in relation to psychopathy. In addition, there does not appear to be 
research with individuals scoring high on psychopathy measures that examines whether such 
executive abilities moderate the relationship of emotional experience (e.g., autonomic reactivity) 
to outward emotional expression (e.g., facial expression).   
Psychopathy has universally been recognized as a unitary syndrome in which an 
individual is proposed as having, as mentioned above, a confluence of distinct traits, which 
historically included having above-average intelligence compared to their non-psychopathic 
counterparts (Cleckley, 1941). With this in mind, there has been a general agreement that deficits 
associated with PCL-R factor one scores of psychopathy were the consequence of a central 
emotional deficiency insofar that physiological responses and emotional expression were 
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presumably not a result of reduced cognitive ability (Hare, 1970; Levenston et al., 2000). Both 
ideas, however, have come under scrutiny in recent years due to ongoing research exploring 
cognitive abilities in people with high scores on psychopathy measures (Dvorak-Bertscha et al., 
2009). There is burgeoning evidence that reduced executive functioning ability mediates the 
relationship involved in affective response to stimuli and psychopathy. Specifically, research has 
found that individuals with relatively higher levels of psychopathy scores and lower executive 
functioning capabilities show decreased affective response to emotionally-evocative stimuli 
(Simpson et al., 2001; Hariri et al.,2003; Dvorak- Bertscha et al., 2009, Curtin et al., 2001). 
Another study found that higher scores on primary psychopathy but with lower levels of 
intelligence elicit reduced autonomic reactivity to evocative images (Bate et al., 2014). Research 
findings relating to executive functioning may explain a competing theory insofar that cognitive 
functioning may mediate the relation, in which there is intact arousal experience but a lower 
outward expression of emotion.  
Research has further detailed the relationship between psychopathy and reduced 
executive functioning performance, including working memory. The role of working memory 
has been comparable to the above phenomena, less explored, and equivocal (Brazil et al., 2013, 
Delfin et al., 2018; Sadeh & Verona, 2008; Hansen et al., 2007; Hoppenbrouwers, 2015). 
Working memory is considered a subtype of executive functioning whereby it refers to the active 
and top-down manipulation of information that is held in short-term memory (Nee et al., 2013). 
This subtype of executive functioning is a limited capacity portion of the human memory system 
that integrates the temporary storage and subsequent manipulation of information to help 
facilitate the cognition process (Nee et al., 2013). In a systematic review conducted by Brazil et 
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al. (2013), across four aspects of executive functioning aspects (working memory, planning, 
attention, and inhibition), there were no consistent and significant relationships between 
performance and psychopathy scores. Delfin et al. (2018) found that working memory deficits 
were prevalent in only individuals scoring higher on secondary psychopathy, whereas Bagshaw 
et al. (2014) found that greater deficits in executive functioning, including working memory are 
also correlated with the affective (i.e., primary) component of psychopathy.  
Hoppenbrouwers et al. (2015) found that primary psychopathic traits are associated with 
deficits in top-down incorporation of contextual information and are associated with response 
modulation problems. Other research found that when examining primary and secondary factors, 
individuals scoring higher in primary psychopathy, but not consistently secondary psychopathy, 
show deficiencies in response reversal, reversal learning, decision making, attention, planning, 
and inhibitory control (Baliousis et al., 2019, Mitchell, 2015; De Brito et al., 2013; Rita et al., 
2018; Rolls, 2004; Zeier et al., 2012; Krakowski et al., 2015; Bagshaw et al., 2014; Kim & Jung, 
2014). Although there is support for executive functioning deficits in psychopathy, other 
researchers have found no difference in executive functioning performance and working 
memory, and psychopathy when compared to healthy participants (Hare, 1984; Hare et al., 1990, 
Brazil et al., 2013). The equivocal findings listed above, may have varied due to an inconsistent 
way to explain and measure psychopathic subtypes (i.e., primary and secondary) and to examine 
one’s intelligence and executive functioning. 
As previously mentioned, emotional deficits are integral to the construct of psychopathy 
and empirical evidence suggests that individuals with psychopathy have reduced emotional 
expression (Patrick, 1994; Hare, 2003). Despite the burgeoning literature, the mechanisms that 
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underlie the blunted affect remain elusive. Beyond cognitive capacity or cognitive capabilities, 
an additional theory for the disconnect between emotional experience and emotional expression 
is that individuals with psychopathy suppress the expression of their emotion more frequently 
than average (Nentjes et al., 2016). Individuals in the general population vary in the use and 
ability to intentionally suppress expression of emotion through facial expressions, vocal 
acoustics, and body movements/posture. This type of intentional suppression has been shown to 
reduce internal experience of positive emotions and increase experience of negative emotions in 
non-psychiatric participants (Gross & John, 2003). As expression suppression is volitional, this 
would theoretically result in an intact experience of emotion with a relative reduction in the 
external expression of that emotion, causing a decoupling of experience and expression.  
While there does not appear to be research on emotion suppression and psychopathy, 
increased emotion suppression has been found to relate to other forms of psychopathology such 
as Borderline Personality Disorder, Depression, Anxiety Disorders, and eating and substance 
related disorders (Carpenter & Trull, 2013; Aldao et al., 2010; DiMaggoi et al., 2017). Although 
there does not appear to be research pertaining to emotion suppression in psychopathy, 
researchers have found that greater severity of primary psychopathy relates to a reduction in 
more broadly defined healthy emotional regulation strategies (Garolfalo et al., 2018). With this, 
there is reason to believe that individuals with primary psychopathy may engage in more 
frequent use of unhealthy regulation strategies such as volitional suppression of experienced 
emotion. 
The findings above suggest value in a novel investigation of the potential for severity of 
primary and secondary psychopathy, executive functioning ability, and use of emotional 
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expression suppression to result in decoupling of emotional experience and expression. A better 
understanding of the associations between psychopathy and internal versus external emotional 
reactivity will help refine assessment and treatment of individuals presenting to clinical settings 
with a high level of psychopathy. For example, if a person high in psychopathy lacks expression 
of emotion but has an intact emotional experience, this could direct a clinician to use social skills 
training to increase expression to be commensurate with internal experience. This, in turn would 
theoretically, increase social functioning, which relies on accurate expression of internal emotion 
cues when interacting with others.  
Considering existing empirical evidence, it is reasonable to predict three possible models 
that may explain reduced affect in primary psychopathy or psychopathy universally. One model 
is that individuals with primary psychopathy display blunted expressed affect due to reduced 
cognitive resources (e.g., working memory), overwhelming the successful operation of internal 
experience to evoke an external emotional expression. A second model is that individuals with 
higher primary and/or secondary psychopathy scores show more frequent use of volitional 
expression suppression, leading to a disconnect between experiencing emotion and expressing an 
appropriate presentation of emotion. However, this model is exploratory due to the lack of 
existing research to inform this hypothesis. A third model is that individuals scoring higher on 
primary psychopathy have a reduced internal emotional experience, which would directly cause 
reduced expression without volitional intent. Therefore, the aim of the current study is to 
examine these competing models in a sample of undergraduate students who vary on dimensions 
of primary and secondary psychopathy scores.  
Hypotheses: 
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1) Hypothesis #1: Individuals who score higher on primary, but not secondary, psychopathy 
will show reduced performance on a visuospatial working memory task. 
2) Hypothesis #2: Individuals who score higher in primary, but not secondary, psychopathy 
will report increased daily volitional expression suppression. 
3) Hypothesis #3: Independent of psychopathy scores, visuospatial working memory 
performance will moderate the relationship between internal emotional experience and 
automatic expression. Specifically, individuals with lower working memory performance 
will report reduced automatic expression relative to their internal experience. 
4) Hypothesis #4: Independent of psychopathy scores, the degree of daily volitional 
expression suppression will moderate the relationship between emotional experience and 
expression. Specifically, individuals reporting increased daily expression suppression will 
show reduced expression relative to their experience. 
5) Hypothesis 5: Primary, but not secondary, psychopathy scores will moderate the 
relationship between emotional experience and automatic expression in the direction that 
individuals with higher primary psychopathy scores will report reduced automatic 
emotional expression relative to their internal experience. 
6) Hypothesis 6: There will be a three-way interaction between the moderators of primary 
psychopathy scores, visuospatial working memory performance, and degree of daily use 
of volitional expression suppression on moderating the relationship between internal 
emotional experience and expression. Specifically, individuals with a combination of 
higher primary psychopathy scores, lower working memory scores, and higher scores of 
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volitional expression suppression will show the largest reduction of emotional expression 




Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in a Psychology course at the 
University of Central Florida who received course credit for participation through the Sona 
Systems portal. Students were required to be at least eighteen years or older to complete the 
study. An initial sample of 236 participants completed a portion of the study. Seventy of these 
participants were excluded because they either did not finish the n-back task or stated that we 
should not use their data on the SRASQ (see Measures below). Participants were then excluded 
based on a probability that they were “button-pressing” throughout working memory testing, 
wherein, it is reasonable to believe that participants were seemingly equally as likely to press a 
button to a given stimulus if it is a correct or incorrect response (defined as false alarms > hits for 
either the one or two back condition; n = 20). Participants who completed the study too quickly 
(i.e., < 10th percentile in duration compared to entire sample) were excluded for high likelihood 
of inadequate attention to item content (n = 15). For this reason, one participant was excluded as 
a result of pressing too little on the 1-back task (i.e., Z < -3.00 – false alarms + hits). Two 
participants were subsequently removed on the 2-back task for comparable reasons, wherein zero 
were noted for such issues on the 3-back. Responses to two validity scales were utilized to 
exclude further participants (see Measures section for description of the validity scales). One 
participant was removed after endorsing two infrequency questions incorrectly. One additional 
participant was removed as a statistical outlier (see Statistical Analysis section below).  
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Following these exclusions, 126 participants remained in the final analysis (mean age = 
19.60 (SD = 4.51); range: 18 to 49; 62.7% women). For race, 70.6% (n = 89) endorsed 
“Caucasian/White,” 10.3% (n = 13) “Mixed (substantial mixture of above),” 8.7% (n = 11) 
“Asian,” 6.3% (n = 8) “African American/Black,” 3.2% (n = 4) “Other”, and 0.8% (n = 1) 
“American Indian or Alaskan Native.” Separate from race, 24.6% (n = 31) endorsed an ethnicity 
of “Hispanic/Latino(a).” 
A sensitivity power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Version 3.1.9.6) assuming 
use of linear multiple regression with a fixed model examining change in R2, with 14 predictors 
of interest (includes all interactions) and two covariates. Assuming a two-tailed alpha of .05, 
power = .80, and 126 final participants, results showed that we had power to detect medium and 
large effect sizes of f2 > .15  
Measures 
Validity Scale #1: The Abbreviated Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; 
Reynolds, 1982).  This thirteen-item true/false short form was used to exclude participants who 
are unwilling to endorse minor personal shortcomings that are common in the general population 
(Reynolds, 1982). Participants who score higher than two standard deviations above the mean of 
the entire sample were excluded from the final data analysis to reduce the likelihood of socially 
desirable responding on the measures of interest. 
Validity Scale #2: Insufficient Effort Responding Infrequency Scale (IERIS). This scale 
contains eight highly-improbable events (e.g., “I eat cement occasionally.;” I have never used a 
computer.;” Huang et al., 2015). Participants who endorsed two or more items incorrectly were 
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excluded due to the likelihood of poor attention to item content across all measures. Pairs of the 
eight items were placed in between other scales of interest.  
Validity Scale #3: Self-Report of Attention to study Questions (SRASQ). Following 
completion of all study measures, the participants were asked a question. The students inputted a 
response to indicate whether the researchers of this study should use their data. The wording of 
this measure was slightly modified from Meade and Craig (2012): "Lastly, it is vital to our study 
that we only include responses from people that devoted their full attention to this study. 
Otherwise years of effort (the researchers and the time of other participants) could be wasted. 
Often there are several distractions present during online studies (e.g., other people, television, 
music). You will receive credit for this study no matter what. In your honest opinion, should we 
use your data in our analyses in this study? YES/NO. We appreciate your honesty!" According to 
Meade and Craig (2012), approximately ten percent of participants will answer "no” which was 
highly predictive of other validity problems in their study. Therefore, we excluded all 
participants who responded with “no” to this question.  
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Measure (LSRP). Psychopathy was measured using 
the LSRP, a 26-item self-report scale originally constructed with a college student sample and 
widely used in non-institutionalized samples (Levenson et al., 1995; Garofalo, 2019). The items 
are rated on a four-choice Likert scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” 
and include attributes that prompt trait-like rather than state responses. The LSRP produces two 
subscales for the severity of primary and secondary psychopathy, with higher scores 
demonstrating greater severity. A substantial number of studies have upheld the construct 
validity and reliability of this two-factor model and the advantages of studying psychopathy 
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using a dimensional approach rather than categorically (e.g., Miller et al., 2008; Friedman et al., 
2018; Garofalo et al., 2019; Salekin et al., 2014; Book et al., 2007; Brinkley et al., 2001). Also, 
researchers suggest that a two-factor dimensional approach to psychopathy appears to 
demonstrate greater convergent and discriminant validity as opposed to psychopathy studied as a 
general category (Tsang et al., 2018; Salekin et al., 2014). The two scores for primary and 
secondary psychopathy severity were used in the regressions.  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form (PANAS-X). Emotional 
experience was measured using the PANAS-X, a measure designed to describe different feelings 
and emotions. This measure involves sixty words and phrases scored on a 1 (very likely or not at 
all) to 5 (extremely) Likert Scale. Participants were asked to indicate how much they feel certain 
emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, anxiousness, etc.) at specified intervals of time (Watson & 
Clark, 1994). For this study, the researchers modified the directions to ask participants how they 
typically felt over the past year. This modification to a period of time was analogous to the 
frequency of time asked in other measures. The internal consistency and convergent and 
discriminant validities of both positive and negative affect are high (Costa et al., 2020). An 
average item score across all positive valence items (PANAS_POS) and separately for negative 
valence items (PANAS_NEG) were used in the regressions. 
Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (BEQ): Gross and John (1995) conceptualized emotional 
expressivity as a constant trait, and developed a short, self-report questionnaire to examine it. For 
the purpose of this study and to be consistent with the time period of the PANAS-X, the 
instructions were customized to ask participant to respond according to what they experienced 
over the past year. The BEQ comprises sixteen items and three subscales (positive expressivity, 
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negative expressivity, and impulsivity). Impulsivity, originally termed impulse strength, refers to 
the strong emotional reactions that are analogous to the experience of physical changes that 
participants are unable to prevent or subdue (Gross & John, 1995). Responses are scored using a 
seven-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The average 
score of each subscale is calculated to measure the salience of each component, whereas general 
expressivity is measured by averaging all subscale scores. The full-scale and subscale scores 
assess both the potency of emotional response tendencies and the degree that they are expressed 
behaviorally (Lin et al., 2015). The full scales and subscale scores have been shown to maintain 
internal consistency, reliability, and validity scores among distinct samples (Gross & John, 1995; 
Lin et al., 2015). The subscales of positive expressivity (BES_POS) and negative expressivity 
(BES_NEG) were used in the regressions. 
Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale (EEES; Bedwell et al., 2019). 
Emotional suppression was measured using the EEES, a 14-item self-report measure of 
emotional experience and suppression of expression. Participants were asked to respond to two 
questions (“In the past year, how often have you felt this way?” and “Generally, when you feel 
this way, do you tend to show or hide the way you feel?”. Participants received a list of seven 
emotion type prompts and, for each, responded to the two questions using a seven-point Likert 
scale. The EEES assesses a variety of positive and negative emotions (“hostility-angry, hostile”; 
“guilt-guilty, ashamed;” “sadness-sad, lonely;” “joviality-happy, excited;” “self-assurance-proud, 
confident;” and “attentiveness-alert, attentive”) and the frequency of suppressing expressions of 
emotions. For this study, only the responses from the seven suppression questions (i.e., …tend to 
show or hide…) were used, and subscales for average item scores for positively valanced 
 25 
emotions (EEES_POS) and negatively valanced emotions (EEES_NEG) were used in the 
regressions. 
Visuospatial Working Memory Task (“n-back task”). Kirchner (1958) developed a 
continuous performance task to measure visuospatial working memory, which has since been 
called a type of “n-back” task. Various versions of the n-back task have been frequently used 
over time to measure individual differences in working memory performance. The current study 
used a particular visuospatial version of the n-back that was published on pavlovia.org which 
was modeled after the original task. Participants were asked to monitor a series of squares 
appearing randomly in one of eight potential locations and to press a keyboard button if a given 
square was presented at the same location as the one presented N trials ago, where N is a 
predefined integer. The N typically ranges between one and three, wherein the higher the number 
(i.e., 3-back), the more challenging the task is for participants (Schwippel et al., 2018; see Figure 
1, p. 69 for depiction of the task). This spatial n-back task was programmed with PsychoPy 
Version 1.83.04 (Pierce, 2007). 
The n-back test used in this study mirrored the procedures and methods outlined in 
Schwippel et al.’s (2018) study. The test was presented in sequential order of N conditions, 
starting with 1-back and ending with the 3-back and the inter-stimulus interval occurred as a 
blank screen for 2.5 seconds between each stimulus. Twenty-five percent of the stimuli 
presented, at random, were correct targets (i.e., in the same location as n-trials prior). Each 
condition (N) lasted approximately six minutes, with a pause of sixty seconds in between. 
Following instructions, each condition contained 120 trials of a blue square randomly appearing 
for 500 ms in one of eight positions in a square configuration around a central fixation cross. 
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Participants were asked to push the spacebar on their keyboard as fast as possible upon observing 
the correct target. Participants were instructed to not respond when a target is not in the same 
location as n-trials prior. The discriminability index d’ (d-prime), based upon signal detection 
theory, was calculated by using the formula d’ = Z(hit rate) − Z(false alarm rate; Stanislaw and 
Todorov, 1999). This is a type of accuracy that accounts for both specificity (i.e., false alarms) 
and sensitivity (i.e., hit rate) to presented stimuli (Stanislaw and Todorov, 1999). The n-back task 
requires a multitude of cognitive processes; for example, the tasks measure one’s ability to 
encode and temporarily store each stimulus and continuously update the information of incoming 
stimuli (Gajewski, 2018). The n-back tasks thus are an efficient method to assess individual 
differences in working memory performance (Gajewski, 2018). The primary analyses will use 
the average d’ across the 2- and 3-back conditions (nback_d_av).   
Procedures 
The entire study was administered online. Each individual initiated participation using the 
Sona Systems portal, which stated that they must complete using a keyboard in order to 
participate. The participants were transferred to the Qualtrics website for the study which began 
with an informed consent statement. If the participant elected to participate, they began by 
completing demographic questions. Following this, participants completed each of the scales 
listed in the Measures section above, in consecutive order. Pairs of the eight infrequency scale 
items were placed in between other scales. Participants were then transferred to the Pavlovia.org 
website which hosted the n-back task. After completing the working memory task, participants 
completed the SRASQ validity measure and viewed an informational form that explained the 
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study more in-depth. The completion of the study was then communicated by Pavlovia to Sona 
Systems so that the participants received the academic credit.  
Statistical Analysis 
All of the final 126 participants had scores on all variables in the analysis. Each variable 
was examined for statistical outliers using the criteria of a Z score over ± 3.00. These resulting Z 
scores were then used in all analyses for ease of interpretation when comparing scales. The initial 
two hypotheses were examined with independent linear regressions, covarying for age and 
biological sex. The remaining hypotheses were then examined using hierarchical linear 
regressions with the dependent continuous variable of BEQ scores (i.e., self-reported emotional 
expression), and the five predictors of primary psychopathy scores, secondary psychopathy 
scores, emotion expression suppression scores (EEES), emotional experience scores (PANAS), 
and visuospatial working memory performance (d’ from n-back task) – along with two-, three-, 
and four-way interactions among them, and including age and sex in Block 1. Two of the 
hierarchical regressions were conducted, one using positive valance scores for the BEQ, EEES, 
and PANAS, and the other using the negative valence scores from those measures. Hypotheses 3 
to 6 were addressed through examining interactions of the PANAS and other predictors in the 
prediction of BEQ scores. Any statistically significant interactions were then examined through 
the simple effects for interpretation. 
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RESULTS 
  Across participants, all variables of interest showed relatively normal distributions. 
Examination for statistical outliers on variables of interest revealed one participant who was 
excluded for the PANAS_TOT variable, resulting in the final 126 participants. See Table 1 for 
descriptive statistics and Table 2 for zero-order Pearson correlations.  
 To address hypothesis #1, a linear regression was used to enter age and sex in the null 
model followed by predictors of primary and secondary psychopathy severity on the dependent 
variable of average n-back score. This regression found that, as predicted, primary psychopathy 
severity showed a negative relationship with performance on the n-back (B = -.29, p = .005; see 
Figure 2, p. 70), while there was no relationship with secondary psychopathy severity (B = .12, p 
= .22). 
 To address hypothesis #2, the same type of linear regression was used, but two were 
examined – one with the DV of level of suppression of positive emotions and the other with the 
DV of level of suppression of negative emotions. For positive emotions, neither primary (B = -
.10, p = .34) or secondary (B = .15, p = .12) psychopathy related to level of suppression. There 
was a similar lack of relationship with suppression of negative emotions for primary (B = -.005, 
p = .96) and secondary (B = .01, p = .91) psychopathology severity. 
To address the remaining hypotheses, we conducted two additional regressions, one for 
positive emotions and one for negative emotions. See Table 3 (p. 58) for the regression statistics 
for positive emotions. Age did not relate to expression for either positive or negative 
expressivity, but sex showed a main effect such that women reported a greater degree of 
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expressing positive emotions than men. There was a positive main effect for experience of 
emotion (PANAS_POS) and a negative relationship for degree of suppression (EEES_POS), 
both on strength of expression (BEQ_POS). However, there were no significant interactions in 
the model. Therefore, there was no support for hypotheses three through six in the model using 
positive emotions. 
See Table 4 (p. 60) for the regression statistics for negative emotions. For this model, 
hypotheses three through five were not supported. However, we found support for hypothesis 6 
through a statistically significant four-way interaction. This interaction included primary 
psychopathy severity, working memory performance (nback_d_av), degree of volitional 
expression suppression (EEES_NEG), and internal emotional experience (PANAS_NEG) in 
predicting emotional expression (BEQ_NEG) in regard to negative emotions. The second four-
way interaction that accounted for secondary, rather than primary, psychopathy scores was not 
statistically significant.  
We then examined the simple effects of the significant four-way interaction from the 
negative emotion regression. At the initial level, we used a median split to create subgroups with 
low and high primary psychopathy scores. There were no significant interactions with variables 
included in the low primary psychopathy group model. Thus, the use of the subgroup with low 
primary psychopathy scores was discontinued from further examination (see Table 5, p. 63). For 
the high primary psychopathy subgroup, a significant two-way interaction was found for 
experience of negative emotions (PANAS_NEG) and the use of emotional suppression 
(EEES_NEG) in predicting emotional expression (BEQ_NEG; see Table 6, p. 65). While the 
three-way interaction that included n-back performance was not statistically significant, the n-
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back variable was retained as a covariate in remaining simple effects as it was a part of the initial 
significant four-way interaction.  
Further analysis of the subgroup with high psychopathy scores was conducted, wherein 
we created a median split to create subgroups scoring low and high in the use of volitional 
emotion suppression (EEES_NEG). There was no signification relationship between the 
PANAS_NEG and BEQ_NEG for the subgroup with high primary psychopathy and low emotion 
suppression (see Table 7, p. 67). In the subgroup with high primary psychopathy and high 
volitional emotion suppression (EEES_NEG), we found a significant negative relationship 
between experience of negative emotions (PANAS_NEG) and emotion expression (BEQ_NEG; 
see Table 8, p. 68; and Figure 3, p. 71).
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DISCUSSION 
 The present study aimed to examine three models that may explain or contribute to 
reduced expressed affect in a non-clinical sample of individuals with varying scores on a self-
report measure that assessed severity of subtypes of psychopathy. The association pertaining to 
the first hypothesis was, as predicted, accounted for and shown to be significant, wherein as 
scores on primary psychopathy severity increase, there is a comparable declination or lowering 
of one’s performance on the n-back visuo-spatial working memory test (see Figure 2, p. 70). As 
previously stated, a unanimous agreement on factors or severity of such factors, and an 
association between executive functioning scores is contentious and unresolved. In Cleckley’s 
work (1941), the notion of psychopathy involved one who maintains superior knowledge relative 
to a healthy person without high levels of psychopathy. Previous research has been unable to 
demonstrably evince differences between the intelligence of individuals with and without 
psychopathy (e.g., Nee el al., 2013; Bagshaw et al., 2013). Such findings may, as a result, stem 
from lack of consensus on how to properly assess for levels of psychopathy, with researchers 
electing to utilize a myriad of assessments and examine different populations.  
 Recent research indicates, however, that the association between higher levels 
intelligence and primary psychopathy is generally weak and inconclusive (Hare & Neumann, 
2008; Bate et al., 2014). In a review, Brazil et al. (2013) found inconsistent results across four 
aspects of executive functioning. Other researchers found executive functioning deficits in only 
individuals who score high severity on secondary psychopathy with no relationships between 
intelligence and primary psychopathy (Delfin et al., 2018). Bagshaw et al. (2014) noted larger 
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deficits in executive functioning as related to primary and total psychopathy alike. Bagshaw et al. 
(2014) found that, while using the PCL-R two-factor approach, primary psychopathy was more 
negatively associated with planning time, response inhibition, and inadequate set-shifting; in 
Delfin et al. (2018), however, findings were contrary. This may stem from the participants used, 
wherein Delfin et al. used incarcerated male young offenders (age 18-25) who were convicted of 
hands-on violence. Bagshaw et al. (2014), while also using incarcerated offenders, they ranged in 
age (25-54). In addition, Delfin et al. (2018) noted that while such a pattern has emerged, results 
of executive functioning scores remain inconclusive. With this, it was reported that the 
inconclusive findings were relevant to “the broad nature of EFs [executive functioning];” 
wherein results are difficult to universalize (Delfin et al., 2018).  
 A possible reason for the association between individuals scoring high on primary 
psychopathy severity and lower working memory capacity pertains to the notion that attentional 
deficits that, while equivocal between researchers, has more recently been shown to be present in 
individuals scoring higher on psychopathy assessments (Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2015; Kosson & 
Newman, 1986; Baliousis et al., 2019). In the research conducted by Baliousis et al. (2019), 
individuals scoring higher on a measure of psychopathy showed reduced performance in 
attention and inhibitory control. Thus, for working memory tasks, assessments designed to 
temporarily hold and manipulate information, lack of attention to the information presented, will, 
result in reduced correct responses and, thus, a reduction in working memory capacity. 
Individuals with high primary, as opposed to secondary, psychopathy show deficiencies in 
response reversal, reversal learning, decision making, attention, planning, and inhibitory control 
(Baliousis et al., 2019, Mitchell, 2015; De Brito et al., 2013; Rita et al., 2018; Rolls, 2004; Zeier 
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et al., 2012; Krakowski et al., 2015; Bagshaw et al., 2014; Kim & Jung, 2014). With this, 
difficulties with sustained attention and visual searching may attenuate visuo-spatial working 
memory capacity in individuals with higher scores on primary psychopathy.  
The results of this data did not corroborate the second hypothesis, wherein it was 
considered that individuals who score higher in primary, but not secondary psychopathy, will 
report increased daily volitional expression suppression. The data did not provide evidence for 
increased expression suppression in either dimensional aspect of psychopathy. The reasoning for 
the hypothesis pertained to the idea that emotional deficits are integral to the construct of 
psychopathy, in particular, primary psychopathy, wherein emotional expression is considered to 
be reduced or absent (Patrick, 1994; Hare, 2003). While it was noted that there does not appear 
to be research on emotional suppression relevant to psychopathy, research has previously 
indicated a decreased use of healthy emotional regulation strategies in individuals scoring higher 
on psychopathy (Garolfalo et al., 2018). With this, the volitional use of suppression of expression 
was considered a plausible avenue for individuals scoring high on primary psychopathy to show 
a disconnect to experience of emotion and subsequent expression. It is interesting to note, 
however, that when examining zero-order correlations among all variables, the PANAS score of 
experiencing negative emotion was not associated with the subsequent test, BEQ, designed to 
measure the expression of internally experienced emotions in our healthy sample. In particular, 
the zero-order correlation between the experience of negative emotions and the expression of 
such negative emotions were not associated. There appeared only a moderate positive association 
between emotional experience and emotional expression of positive emotions.   
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A possible reason for the absence of any findings pertaining to psychopathy’s sole 
influence on the association between a disconnect between emotional experience and emotional 
expression may be as a result of the utilization of self-report assessments without corroborating 
or disconfirming details available from the use of physiological measures. Ellis et al. (2017) 
found that contrary to electrophysiological data, participants with varying degrees of 
psychopathy did not report experiencing blunted affect and subsequently reported more 
emotional reactivity when told to either volitionally suppress or to not suppress their emotions. 
The researcher’s results indicated inconsistency between self-report questionnaires of emotional 
regulation and suppression and physiological data (Ellis et al., 2017). Thus, the participants may 
have over-estimated their emotional experience and/or expression, potentially due to lack of 
insight regarding subjective emotional experiences. As such, if the researchers were to use 
electrophysiological measures, in addition to self-report indices, results may have been different 
insofar that suppression of emotion was present and active in individuals scoring higher on 
psychopathy factors, in particular, primary psychopathy.  
However, when examining the subset of participants scoring high on primary 
psychopathy and high on volitionally suppressing emotional expression, then a negative 
relationship between emotional experience of negative emotions and external emotional 
expression is evident (see Figure 3, p. 71). Thus, for these participants, a disconnect arises 
between experienced negative emotions and weaker reports of externally expressing such 
emotions. This is partially consistent with the researchers’ last hypothesis relevant to the notion 
of a four-way significant interaction. The consistency stems from the finding that while working 
memory capacity did not result in significant moderation, high primary and high use of volitional 
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suppression of emotion did significantly moderate the disconnect between emotional experience 
and emotional expression. The role of working memory may not have contributed to the 
moderation, possibly due to the use of the subgroup of only those scoring high in psychopathy 
severity. Thus, as a subgroup, those that reported high severity of psychopathy, working memory 
capacity was inherently lower than other groups researched, which may have limited the range 
and variance in working memory scores. The significant four-way interaction was based on 
subscales relating to negative emotions. No such associations were present for the regression 
using subscales for positive emotions. In addition, secondary psychopathy severity did not show 
significant interactions for either emotional valence.  
As relatively true for most aspects of psychopathy research, the examination and 
agreement on the level of emotional experience that an individual with psychopathy experiences, 
remains disputable (e.g., Blair et al, 1997; Kilmonis et al., 2017; Herpetz et al., 2001; Carmen 
Pastor et al., 2003). However, more recent research indicates that individuals who score high on 
psychopathy report experiencing emotions in a similar manner as healthy samples (Verona et al., 
2004; Carmen Pastor et al., 2003). Thus, along with internal experience, the current data indicate 
that while individuals with psychopathy experience negative and positive emotions, a weakening 
connection resulting in reduced affect is possible as a result of utilization of volitional 
suppression of negative emotions. In other words, it was found that individuals who have higher 
experiences of negative emotions, but score higher on primary psychopathy and emotional 
suppression, appear to show a lower strength in expressing their internal emotional experience.  
Primary psychopathy subsumes traits, such as callousness, deceit, manipulation, lack of 
empathy, blunted affect, and deficits in emotional processing (Brook, Brieman, & Kosson, 
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2013). From this exploratory research, it is possible to infer that the deficits in emotional 
processing and subsequently the disconnect between emotional experience and expression may 
pertain to the use of expression suppression as an unhealthy emotional regulation strategy. While 
there does not appear to be research relevant to emotion suppression in psychopathy, researchers 
have found that greater severity of primary psychopathy pertains to a reduction in more broadly 
defined healthy emotional regulation strategies (Garolfalo et al., 2018). As such, the presence of 
a higher use of suppression of emotion in individuals with increased reports of severity of 
primary psychopathy, may explain the disconnect between reported emotional experience of 
negative emotions and lower rates of emotional expression of negative emotions.  
Participants scoring higher on secondary psychopathy did not show the effect of 
increased use of volitional suppression of emotional expression. This disparity seen between 
factors of psychopathy may arise from the inherent characteristics that each factor subsumes. In 
addition to the possibility of unhealthy emotional regulation strategies, the use of emotional 
suppression relates to affective and interpersonal characteristics, as opposed to low frustration 
tolerance, a parasitic lifestyle, impulsivity, and early behavioral problems reflective of secondary 
psychopathy (Hare et al., 1990). As such, underlying emotional deficits present in primary 
psychopathy are not as prevalent in those scoring higher on secondary psychopathy severity. 
Limitations of this study include selection of participants and subsequently sample size. 
As was stated above, all of the participants who completed the study were undergraduate 
students enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Central Florida. This inevitably 
limits the scope of people who were able to participate, thus, also limiting the generalizability of 
the findings described above. Although surpassing the minimum number of participants needed 
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to detect medium effect sizes, the final sample's statistical power diminished as more moderators 
and covariates were added to each block, thus, reducing the initial power. Including more 
participants would increase the statistical power to detect smaller effect sizes. In addition to this, 
the study was limited insofar that the researchers only utilized self-report questionnaires to 
collect data. As mentioned previously, there has been documented discrepancies in findings of, 
for example, self-reported levels of expression suppression and physiological recorded 
responses; thus, possibility leading to inaccuracies in the data collected. Comparably, Brook et 
al. (2013) indicated that it is generally agreed that individuals with increased scores on total 
psychopathy exhibit behavioral, psychophysiological, and regional brain activation anomalies 
when processing emotion; however, their self-report of arousal did not differ from controls.  
Potential improvements to this research study would include supplementing self-report 
responses with electrophysiological measures of emotional reactivity and automated computer-
based video analysis of emotion expression. Researchers could include emotionally-valenced 
images or videos, or another method to invoke differentiating emotions, to capture a participants’ 
actual response to real-time and realistic events. With this, participants will not be required to 
self-reflect on their emotional experience, therefore, providing potentially more accurate data for 
analysis. In a comparable manner, it is recommended that researchers use additional methods to 
assess working memory capacity and include other tasks designed to denote other forms of 
executive functioning.  
The findings of this study could be useful for future research on psychopathy as it relates 
to understanding the characteristics and functioning of psychopathy. Despite the limitation of a 
moderate sample size and data collected in one undergraduate student sample, results suggest 
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that individuals who report higher severity of primary psychopathy in a healthy and non-
incarcerated sample may experience reduced visuo-spatial working memory capacity. 
Additionally, such individuals tend to self-report a weaker strength of emotional expression 
relative to frequency of experience for negative emotions, with higher use of emotional 
suppression as a potentially statistically significant moderator. This may raise awareness in 
clinicians treating individuals deemed high in primary psychopathy to consider social skills 
training to reduce the potential negative impact of reduced negative expressivity on social 
interactions. A replication of this study with a larger and diverse sample is recommended for 
future research with the use of both self-report and physiological measures of emotional 
suppression/expressivity and regulation, along with including a battery of attention, visuo-spatial 




Aldao, A., Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Schweizer, S. (2010). Emotion-regulation strategies across 
psychopathology: A meta-analytic review. Clinical psychology review, 30(2), 217–237. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2009.11.004 American Psychiatric Association. (2013). 
Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: 
Author. 
Bagshaw, R., Gray, N. S., and Snowden, R. J. (2014). Executive function in psychopathy: the 
tower of london, brixton spatial anticipation and the hayling sentence completion 
tests. Psychiatry Res. 220, 483–489. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2014.07.031 
Baliousis, M., Duggan, C., McCarthy, L., Huband, N., & Völlm, B. (2019). Executive function, 
attention, and memory deficits in antisocial personality disorder and 
psychopathy. Psychiatry Research, 278, 151–161. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2019.05.046 
Bate, C., Boduszek, D., Dhingra, K., and Bale, C. (2014). Psychopathy, intelligence and 
emotional responding in a non-forensic sample: an experimental investigation. Jounral 
of Forensic Pscychiatry & Psychology, 25 (5), 600-612. 
Beck, A.T., Steer, R.A., & Brown, G.K. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression Inventory-II. 
San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation. 
 40 
Bedwell, J. S., Cohen, A. S., Spencer, C. C., & Simpson, S. D. (2019). Emotion Experience and 
Expressive Suppression Scale: Psychometric properties and relationships with 
depression and schizotypy. Personality and Individual Differences, 142, 145–152. 
Benning, S. D., Patrick, C. J., Hicks, B. M., Blonigen, D. M., & Krueger, R. F. (2003). Factor 
structure of the psychopathic personality inventory: validity and implications for 
clinical assessment. Psychological assessment, 15(3), 340–350. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.15.3.340 
Blair, R. J. R., Jones, L., Clark, F., & Smith, M. (1997). The psychopathic individual: A lack of 
responsiveness to distress cues? Psychophysiology, 34(2), 192–198. 
Boduszek, D., & Debowska, A. (2016). Critical evaluation of psychopathy measurement (PCL-R 
and SRP-III/SF) and recommendations for future research. Journal of Criminal 
Justice, 44, 1–12. 
Book, A. S., Quinsey, V. L., & Langford, D. (2007). Psychopathy and the perception of affect 
and vulnerability. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 34(4), 531–544. 
Brady, B., Kneebone, I. I., & Bailey, P. E. (2019). Validation of the Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire in older community‐dwelling adults. British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 58(1), 110–122. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjc.12203 
Brazil, I. A., Maes, J. H., Scheper, I., Bulten, B. H., Kessels, R. P., Verkes, R. J., & de Bruijn, E. 
R. (2013). Reversal deficits in individuals with psychopathy in explicit but not implicit 
learning conditions. Journal of Psychiatry & Neuroscience, 38(4), E13–E20. 
https://doi.org/10.1503/jpn.120152 
 41 
Brinkley, C. A., Schmitt, W. A., Smith, S. S., & Newman, J. P. (2001). Construct validation of a 
self-report psychopathy scale: does Levenson’s self-report psychopathy scale measure 
the same constructs as Hare’s psychopathy checklist-revised? Personality and 
Individual Differences, 31, 1021–1038. 
Brook, M., Brieman, C.L., & Kosson, D.S. (2013). Emotion processing in psychopathy checklist 
– Assessed psychopathy: A review of the literature. Clinical Psychology Review, 33, 
979–995 
Carpenter, R. W., & Trull, T. J. (2013). Components of emotion dysregulation in borderline 
personality disorder: a review. Current psychiatry reports, 15(1), 335. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11920-012-0335-2 Casey, H., Rogers, R. D., Burns, T., & 
Yiend, J. (2013). Emotion regulation in psychopathy. Biological Psychology, 92(3), 
541–548. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2012.06.011 
Cleckley, H. M. (1950). The mask of sanity : an attempt to clarify some issues about the so-
called psychopathic personality (2d ed.). Mosby. 
Cohen, A. S., Morrison, S.C., Brown, L.A., & Minor, K.S. (2012). Towards a cognitive resource 
limitations model of diminished expression in schizotypy. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 121(1),109-118. 
Coid, J., Yang, M. (2008). The distribution of psychopathy among a household population: 
categorical or dimensional? Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 43(10), 
773–81. 
 42 
Cooke, D. J., & Sellbom, M. (2019). An examination of Psychopathy Checklist-Revised latent 
factor structure via exploratory structural equation modeling. Psychological 
Assessment, 31(5), 581–591. 
Cooke, D. J., Michie, C. (2001). Refining the construct of psychopathy: Towards a hierarchical 
model. Psychological Assessment, 13, 171–188. 
Costa, P. A., Tasker, F., Ramos, C., & Leal, I. (2020). Psychometric properties of the parent’s 
versions of the SDQ and the PANAS-X in a community sample of Portuguese 
parents. Clinical Child Psychology & Psychiatry, 25(2), 520–532. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1359104519891759 
Curtin, J. J., Patrick, J. P., Lang, A. L., Cacioppo, J. T., & Birbaumer, N. (2001). Alcohol affects 
emotion through cognition. Pyshcological Science, 12(6), 527-5311 
Dawel, A., Wright, L., Dumbleton, R., & McKone, E. (2019). All tears are crocodile tears: 
Impaired perception of emotion authenticity in psychopathic traits. Personality 
Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 10(2), 185–197. 
De Brito, S. A., Viding, E., Kumari, V., Blackwood, N., & Hodgins, S. (2013). Cool and Hot 
Executive Function Impairments in Violent Offenders with Antisocial Personality 
Disorder with and without Psychopathy. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0065566 
de Wied, M., van Boxtel, A., & Matthys, W. (2012). Verbal, facial and autonomic responses to 
empathy-eliciting film clips by disruptive male adolescents with high versus low 
callous-unemotional traits. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10802-011-9557-8 
Dhingra K., Boduszek, D. (2013). Psychopathy and criminal behaviour: A psychosocial research 
perspective. Journal of Criminal Psychology ,83–107. 
 43 
Dimaggio G., Salvatore G., MacBeth A., Ottavi P., Buonocore L., Popolo R. (2017). 
Metacognitive interpersonal therapy for personality disorders: a case study series. 
Journal of Contemporary Psychotherapy, 47, 11-21. doi: 10.1007/s10879-016-9342-7 
Dolan. M, Doyle. M. (2000). Violence risk prediction. Clinical and actuarial measures and the 
role of the Psychopathy Checklist. British Journal of Psychiatry, 177, 303-311. 
 
Delfin, C., Andiné, P., Hofvander, B., Billstedt, E., & Wallinius, M. (2018). Examining 
associations between psychopathic traits and executive functions in incarcerated violent 
offenders. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 9, Article 
310. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2018.00310 
Dvorak-Bertscha, J. D., Curtin, J. J., Rubinstein, T. J., & Newman, J. P. (2009). Psychopathic 
traits moderate the interaction between cognitive and affective processing. 
Psychophysiology, 46, 913–921. 
Edens, J. F, Marcus, D. K, Lilienfeld, S. O., Poythress, N. G. Jr. (2006). Psychopathic, not 
psychopath: taxometric evidence for the dimensional structure of psychopathy. Journal 
of Abnormal Psychology, 115(1), 131–44. 
Ermer, E., Kahn, R. E., Salovey, P., & Kiehl, K. A. (2012). Emotional intelligence in 
incarcerated men with psychopathic traits. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 103(1), 194-204.https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027328 
Fanti, K. A., Colins, O. F., Andershed, H., & Sikki, M. (2017). Stability and change in callous-
unemotional traits: Longitudinal associations with potential individual and contextual 
risk and protective factors. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 87(1), 62–
75. https://doi.org/10.1037/ort0000143 
 44 
Fanti, K. A., Panayiotou, G., Lombardo, M. V., & Kyranides, M.-N. (2016). Unemotional on all 
counts: Evidence of reduced affective responses in individuals with high callous-
unemotional traits across emotion systems and valences. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2015.1034378 
Fowles, D.C., Dindo, L. (2009). Temperament and psychopathy: A dual-pathway model. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 18(3), 179-183. 
Gajewski, P., Hanisch, E., Falkenstein, M., Thönes, S., & Wascher, E. (2018). What Does the n-
Back Task Measure as We Get Older? Relations Between Working-Memory Measures 
and Other Cognitive Functions Across the Lifespan. Frontiers in Psychology, 9. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02208 
 
Garofalo, C., Noteborn, M. G. C., Sellbom, M., & Bogaerts, S. (2019). Factor structure and 
construct validity of the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy scale (LSRP): A 
replication and extension in Dutch nonclinical participants. Journal of Personality 
Assessment, 101(5), 481–492. 
Garofalo, C., Neumann, C. S., & Velotti, P. (2018). Difficulties in emotion regulation and 
psychopathic traits in violent offenders. Journal of Criminal Justice, 57, 116–125. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2018.05.013 
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (1995).  Facets of emotional expressivity: Three self-report factors and 
their correlates.  Personality and Individual Differences, 19, 555-568. 
 45 
Gross, J. J. (1998). Antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation: Divergent 
consequences for experience, expression, and physiology. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 74, 224–237. 
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: 
Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85(2), 348-362. 
Hagenmuller, F., Rössler, W., Endrass, J., Rossegger, A., & Haker, H. (2012). [Impaired 
resonance in offenders with psychopathic traits]. Neuropsychiatrie : Klinik, Diagnostik, 
Therapie Und Rehabilitation : Organ Der Gesellschaft Osterreichischer Nervenarzte 
Und Psychiater, 26(2), 65–71. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40211-012-0015-9 
Hare, R. D. (1984). Performance of psychopaths on cognitive tasks related to frontal lobe 
function. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 93(2), 133– 
40.   https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.93.2.133 
 
Hare, R. D. (2003). The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised. (2nd ed.). Toronto, Canada: Multi-
Health Systems. 
Hare, R. D., Hart, S.D., & Harpur, T. J. (1991). Psychopathy and the proposed DSM-IV criteria 
for antisocial personality disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 391-398. 
Hare, R. D., Harpur, T. J., Hakstian, A. R., Forth, A. E., Hart, S. D., & Newman, J. P. (1990). 
The revised Psychopathy Checklist: Reliability and factor structure. Psychological 
Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 2, 338 –341. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1040- 3590.2.3.338 
 46 
Hare, R. D., Harpur. T.J., & Hemphill, J.D. (1989). Scoring pamphlet for the Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale: SRP-II. Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada: Simon Fraser 
University. 
 Hare, R. D., & Newman, J. P. (2007). The super-ordinate nature of the Psychopathy Checklist–
Revised. Journal of Personality Disorders, 21, 102-117. 
Harpur, T. J., Hare, R. D., & Hakstian, A. R. (1989). Two-factor conceptualization of 
psychopathy: Construct validity and assessment implications. Psychological 
Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1(1), 6–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.1.1.6 
Harpur, T. J., Hakstian, A. R., & Hare, R. D. (1988). Factor structure of the Psychopathy 
Checklist. Journal of' Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 56, 741-747. 
Hauck-Filho, N., & Teixeira, M. A. (2014). Revisiting the psychometric properties of the 
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 96, 459–
464. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2013.865 
Huang, J.L., Bowling, N.A., Liu, M. & Li, Y. (2015). Detecting insufficient effort responding 
with an infrequency scale: Evaluating validity and participant reactions. Journal of 
Business Psychology, 30, 299-311. 
Kelsey, K.R., Rogers, R. & Robinson, E.V. (2015). Self-Report measures of psychopathy: What 
is their role in forensic assessments?. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral 
Assessment, 37, 380–391. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10862-014-9475-5 
 
 47 
Kosson, D. S., Smith, S. S., & Newman, J. P. (1990). Evaluating the construct validity of 
psychopathy in Black and White male inmates: Three preliminary studies. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 99(3), 250–259. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.99.3.250 
Krakowski, M. I., Foxe, J., de Sanctis, P., Nolan, K., Hoptman, M. J., Shope, C., Kamiel, S., & 
Czobor, P. (2015). Aberrant response inhibition and task switching in psychopathic 
individuals. Psychiatry Research, 229(3), 1017–1023. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2015.06.018 
Kim, Y. Y., & Jung, Y. S. (2014). Reduced frontal activity during response inhibition in 
individuals with psychopathic traits: An sLORETA study. Biological Psychology, 97, 
49–59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2014.02.004 
Kirchner, W. K. (1958). Age differences in short-term retention of rapidly changing 
information. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55, 352–358. doi: 
10.1037/h0043688 
Kreis, M. K., Cooke, D. J., Michie, C., Hoff, H. A., & Logan, C. (2012). The Comprehensive 
Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP): Content validation using prototypical 
analysis. Journal of Personality Disorders, 26, 402–413. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/pedi.2012.26.3.402 
Künecke, J., Mokros, A., Olderbak, S., & Wilhelm, O. (2018). Facial responsiveness of 
psychopaths to the emotional expressions of others. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190714 
Lazarus, R. S., & Alfert, E. (1964). Short-circuiting of threat by experimentally altering 
cognitive appraisal. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 69, 195–205. 
 48 
Levenson, M. R., Kiehl, K.A., & Fitzpatrick, C.M. (1995). Assessing psychopathic attributes in a 
noninstitutionalized population. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 
151–158.http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.68.1.151. 
Lilienfeld, S. (1990). Development and preliminary validation of a self-report measure of 
psychopathic personality (Unpublished doctoral dissertation) University of Minnesota; 
Minneapolis, MN. 
Lin, M., Soi-Kawase, S., Narita-Ohtaki, R., Itoh, M., & Kim, Y. (2015). Reliability and validity 
of a self-report emotional expressivity measure: The Japanese version of the Berkeley 
Expressivity Questionnaire. Japan Journal of Nursing Science,13(1), 196–201. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jjns.12094 
Lishner, D. A., Swim, E. R., Hong, P. Y., & Vitacco, M. J. (2011). Psychopathy and ability 
emotional intelligence: Widespread or limited association among facets? Personality 
and Individual Differences, 50(7), 1029–1033. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.01.018 
Long, K., Felton, J. W., Lilienfeld, S. O., & Lejuez, C. W. (2014). The role of emotion regulation 
in the relations between psychopathy factors and impulsive and premeditated 
aggression. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 5(4), 390–396. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/per0000085 
Lösel, F. (2001). Is effective treatment of psychopathy possible? Violence and Psychopathy. 
New York: Springer. 
Marsh, A. A. (2013). What can we learn about emotion by studying psychopathy? Frontiers in 
Human Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00181 
 49 
Malterer, M.B., Glass, S.J., Newman, J.P. (2008). Psychopathy and trait emotional intelligence. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 44(3), 735-745. 
Meade, A. W., & Craig, S. B. (2012). Identifying careless responses in survey 
data. Psychological Methods, 17(3), 437–455. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028085 
Miller, J. D., Gaughan, E. T., & Pryor, L. R. (2008). The Levenson self-report psychopathy scale 
an examination of the personality traits and disorders associated with the LSRP factors. 
Assessment, 15(4), 450–463. doi: 10.1177/1073191108316888 
Miller, J. D., & Lynam, D. (2001). Structural models of personality and their relation to 
antisocial behavior: A meta-analytic review. Criminology, 39, 765–798. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125 
Mitchell, D., Fine, C., Richell, R., Newman, C., Lumsden, J., Blair, K., & Blair, J. (2015). 
Instrumental learning and relearning in individuals with psychopathy and in patients 
with lesions involving the amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0894-4105.20.3.280 
Morey, L., C. (2007). The Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), Professional manual. 2. 
Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. 
Murrie, D. C., Boccaccini, M. T., Caperton, J., & Rufino, K. (2012). Field validity of the 
Psychopathy Checklist–Revised in sex offender risk assessment. Psychological 
Assessment, 24 (2), 524–529. 
Murrie, D.C., Marcus, D.K., Douglas, K.S., Lee Z., Salekin, R. T., Vincent, G. (2007). Youth 
with psychopathy features are not a discrete class: A taxometric analysis. Journal of 
Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48 (7), 714–23. 
 50 
Neumann, C. S., & Hare, R. D. (2007). Psychopathic traits in the MacArthur community sample. 
Manuscript under review. 
Neumann, C. S., Kosson, D., Forth, A. E., & Hare, R. D. (2006). Factor structure of the 
Hare Psychopathy Checklist: Youth Version in incarcerated adolescents. Psychological 
Assessment, 18, 142-154. 
Ogloff, J. R., & Wong, S. (1990). Electrodermal and cardiovascular evidence of a coping 
response in psychopaths. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 17(2), 231–245. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854890017002006 
Carmen Pastor, M. C., Molto, J., Lang, J. P. (2003). Startle reflex modulation, affective ratings 
and autonomic reactivity in incarcerated Spanish psychopaths. Psychophysiology, 
40(6), 934-938. 
Patrick, C. J. (2010). Operationalizing the triarchic conceptualization of psychopathy: 
Preliminary description of brief scales for assessment of boldness, meanness, and 
disinhibition. Unpublished test manual, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL. 
Patrick, C. J. (1994). Emotion and psychopathy: Startling new insights. Psychophysiology, 
31, 319–330. doi:10.1111/psyp.1994.31. 
Patrick, J. C., Bradley, M. M., Lang, J. P. (1993). Emotion in the criminal psychopath: Startle 
Reflex Modulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102(1), 82-92. 
Pham, T.H., Ducro, C, Luminet, O. (2010). Psychopathy, alexithymia, and emotional intelligence 
in a forensic hospital. International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 9(24), 32. 
Peirce, J. W. (2007). PsychoPy –Psychophysics software in Python. J. Neuroscience 
Methodology, 162, 8–13. 
 51 
Plourde, A., Moullec, G., Bacon, S. L., Suarthana, E., & Lavoie, K. L. (2016). Optimizing 
screening for depression among adults with asthma. Journal of Asthma, 53, 736–743. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3109/02770903 .2016.1145692 
Reis, D. J., Namekata, M. S., Oehlert, M. E., & King, N. (2019). A preliminary review of the 
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) in veterans: Are new norms and cut scores 
needed? Psychological Services. https://doi.org/10.1037/ser0000342.supp 
(Supplemental) 
Reynolds, W.M. (1982). Development of reliable and valid short forms of the Marlowe‐Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38, 119-125. 
Rice, M., E., & Harris, G., T. (1995). Violent Recidivism: Assessing predicitive validity. Journal 
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 63(5), 737. 
Rimé, B., Bouvy, H., Leborgne, B., & Rouillon, F. (1978). Psychopathy and nonverbal behavior 
in an interpersonal situation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87(6), 636–643. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.87.6.636 
Rita, P., Cruz, A. R., & Barbosa, F. (2018). Dissociable Effects of Psychopathic traits on 
executive functioning: Insights from the triarchic model. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01713 
Rolls, E. T. (2004). The functions of the orbitofrontal cortex. Brain and Cognition, 55(1), 11–29. 
Roy, S., Vize, C., Uzieblo, K., van Dongen, J. D. M., Miller, J., Lynam, D., Brazil, I., Yoon, D., 
Mokros, A., Gray, N. S., Snowden, R., & Neumann, C. S. (2020). Triarchic or 
Septarchic? — Uncovering the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure’s (TriPM) Structure. 
 52 
Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/per0000392 
Rutter, M. (2012). Psychopathy in childhood: Is it a meaningful diagnosis? British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 200(3), 175–176. Doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.111.092072 
Sacco, R., Santangelo, G., Stamenova, S., Bisecco, A., Bonavita, S., Lavorgna, L., . . . Gallo, A. 
(2016). Psychometric properties and validity of Beck Depression Inventory II in 
multiple sclerosis. European Journal of Neurology, 23, 744–750. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ene.12932 
Salekin, R. T., Chen, D. R., Sellbom, M., Lester, W. S., & MacDougall, E. (2014). Examining 
the factor structure and convergent and discriminant validity of the Levenson self-
report psychopathy scale: is the two-factor model the best fitting model? Personality 
Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 5(3), 289–304. doi: 10.1037/per0000073 
Salekin, R. T., Rogers, R., & Sewell, K. W. (1997). Construct validity of psychopathy in a 
female offender sample: A multitrait–multimethod evaluation. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 106(4), 576–585. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.106.4.576 
Schwippel, T., Papazova, I., Strube, W., Fallgatter, A. J., Hasan, A., & Plewnia, C. (2018). 
Beneficial effects of anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) on spatial 
working memory in patients with schizophrenia. European 




Sellbom, M., & Verona, E. (2007). Neuropsychological correlates of psychopathic traits in a 
non-incarcerated sample. Journal of Research in Personality, 41(2), 276–294. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2006.04.001 
Skeem, J. L., & Cooke, D. J. (2010). Is criminal behavior a central component of psychopathy? 
Conceptual directions for resolving the debate. Psychological Assessment, 22(2), 433–
445. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0008512 
Smith, S. T., Edens, J. F., & Vaughn, M. G. (2011). Assessing the external correlates of 
alternative factor models of the Psycho- pathic Personality Inventory–Short Form 
across three samples. Journal of Personality Assessment, 93, 244–256. 
Strauss, G. P. & Cohen, A.S. (2017). A transdiagnostic review of negative symptom 
phenomenology and etiology." Schizophr Bull 43(4): 712-719. 
Stanislaw, H., Todorov, N. (1999). Calculation of signal detection theory measures. Behavior 
Research Methods Ins. C, 31, 137–149 . 
Subica, A. M., Fowler, J. C., Elhai, J. D., Frueh, B. C., Sharp, C., Kelly, E. L., & Allen, J. G. 
(2014). Factor structure and diagnostic validity of the Beck Depression Inventory-II 
with adult clinical inpatients: Com- parison to a gold-standard diagnostic interview. 
Psychological Assess- ment, 26, 1106–1115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0036998 
Tsang, S., Salekin, R. T., Coffey, C. A., & Cox, J. (2018). A comparison of self-report measures 
of psychopathy among nonforensic samples using item response theory 
analyses. Psychological Assessment, 30(3), 311–327. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0000481.supp (Supplemental) 
 54 
Vaidyanathan, U., Hall, J. R., Patrick, C. J., & Bernat, E. M. (2011). Clarifying the role of 
defensive reactivity deficits in psychopathy and antisocial personality using startle 
reflex methodology. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021224 
Van Boxtel, A. (2010). Facial EMG as a tool for inferring affective states. Proceedings of 
measuring behavior, 104–108. Wageningen: Noldus Information Technology. 
Visser, B.A., Bay, D., Cook, G.L., Myburgh, J. (2010). Psychopathic and antisocial, but not 
emotionally intelligent. Personality and Individual Differences, 48(5), 644-648. 
Vitacco, M. J., Neumann, C. S., & Wodushek, T. (2008). Differential relationships between the 
dimensions of psychopathy and intelligence: Replication with adult jail 
inmates. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 35(1), 48–55. 
Walters, G. D., Duncan, S.A., Mitchell-Perez, K. (2007). The latent structure of psychopathy a 
taxometric investigation of the Psychopathy Checklist–Revised in a heterogeneous 
sample of male prison inmates. Assessment, 14 (3), 270–8. 
Watson D., Clark L.A.  The PANAS-X: Manual for the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-
Expanded Form. University of Iowa; Iowa City, IA, USA: 1994. 
Watts, A. L., Salekin, R. T., Harrison, N., Clark, A., Waldman, I. D., Vitacco, M. J., & 
Lilienfeld, S. O. (2016). Psychopathy: Relations with three conceptions of 
intelligence. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 7(3), 269–279. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/per0000183.supp 
Wilson, L., Miller, J. D., Zeichner, A., Lynam, D. R., & Widiger, T. A. (2011). An examination 
of the validity of the Elemental Psychopathy Assessment: Relations with other 
 55 
psychopathy measures, aggression, and externalizing behaviors. Journal of 
Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 33, 315–322. 
Zeier, J. D., Baskin-Sommers, A. R., Hiatt Racer, K. D., & Newman, J. P. (2012). Cognitive 
control deficits associated with antisocial personality disorder and 




Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Mean (SD); Range Skewness Statistic Kurtosis Statistic  
Primary Psychopathy 1.813 (.38); 1.00 to 2.75 .31 -.14 
Secondary Psychopathy 1.94 (.402); 1.1 to 3.1 .35 -.04 
1PANAS_POS 3.347 (.706); 1.5 to 4.9 -.32 -.35 
2PANAS_NEG 2.265 (.788); 1.0 to 4.8 .69 -.02 
3BEQ_POS 4.99 (1.195); 1.75 to 7.0 -.48 -.41 
4BEQ_NEG 3.43 (1.112); 1.333 to 6.50 .22 -.49 
5EEES_POS 5.114 (1.087); 1.667 to 7.0 -.93 .89 
6EEES_NEG 2.825 (.952); 1.0 to 5.50 .27 -.26 
7nBack_average d'  .017 (1.021); -3.218 to 2.275 -.39 .39 
 
1 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Positive Emotions 
2 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Negative Emotions 
3 Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire- Positive Emotions 
4 Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire- Negative Emotions 
5 Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale- Positive Emotions 
6 Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale- Negative Emotions 
7 N-Back task (working memory) - average d’ from 2 and 3 back conditions 
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Table 2. Zero-Order Pearson Correlations 
 
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
1 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Positive Emotions 
2 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Negative Emotions 
3 Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire- Positive Emotions 
4 Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire- Negative Emotions 
5 Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale- Positive Emotions 
6 Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale- Negative Emotions 
7 nBack task (working memory) - average d’ from 2 and 3 back conditions 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Primary Psychopathy                 
2. Secondary Psychopathy .41 ***               
3. PANAS_POS 1 -.18 *  -.45 ***             
4. PANAS_NEG 2 -.08  .31 *** -.15           
5. BEQ_POS 3 -.12  -.13 .34 *** -.05          
6. BEQ_NEG 4 -.18 * -.13 .04  .02  .66 ***       
7. EEES_POS 5 -.02  -.13 .36 *** -.16 .44 *** .32**     
8. EEES_NEG 6 -.12  -.05  .11 .03  .42 *** .50 *** .32 ***   
9. nBack_average d' 7 -.19 * .02  -.11 .02  -.17 -.08 -.08 .01  
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Table 3. Hierarchical linear regression for subscales involving positive emotions. 
 







Block 1    .080 ** 
Sex  .55 (.18)               .28      .01 **  
Age  01 (.02) .06 .47   
Block 2     
nBack_Average d' 1 -.12 (.08) -.12 .14 .219 *** 
Primary Psychopathy  -.05 (.09) -.05 .59  
Secondary Psychopathy  .06 (.09) .06 .56  
PANAS_POS 2 .22 (.09) .22 .02 *  
EEES_POS 3 -.33 (.08) -.33 
< .001 
***   
Block 3    .023  
EEES_POS * PANAS_POS  .11 (.07) .14 .13  
Secondary Psychopathy * PANAS_POS  -.06 (.09) -.06 .48  
Primary Psychopathy * PANAS_POS  .02 (.08) .02 .81  
nBack_average d' * PANAS_POS  -.13 (.09) -.12 .16   
Block 4    .012  
nBack_average d' * Primary Psychopathy * 
PANAS_POS  -.06 (.14) -.057 .68  
nBack_average d' * Secondary Psychopathy * 
PANAS_POS  -.06 (.15) -.048 .71  
nBack_average d' * EEES_POS * PANAS_POS  -.05 (.09) -.065 .55  
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
1 nBack task (working memory) - average d’ from 2 and 3 back conditions 
2 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Positive Emotions 
3 Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale- Positive 
 59 
Primary Psychopathy * EEES_POS * PANAS_POS  .06 (.09) .006 .96  
Secondary Psychopathy * EEES_POS * PANAS_POS  -.04 (.09) -.071 .63  
Block 5    .014  
PANAS_POS  * EEES_POS  .15 (.11) .20 .17  
PANAS_POS  * primarypsychopathy  .07 (.12) .07 .58  
PANAS_POS  *  secondarypsychopathy  -.17 (.12) -.17 .17  
PANAS_POS  *  nback_d_av  -.04 (.14) -.04 .78  
EEES_POS  *  primarypsychopathy  .01 (.11) .01 .89  
EEES_POS  *  secondarypsychopathy  -.08 (.17) -.09 .62  
EEES_POS  *  nback_d_av  .11 (.12) .11 .34  
primarypsychopathy  * nback_d_av  .14 (.12) .15 .22  
secondarypsychopathy  * nback_d_av  -.12 (.11) -.13 .27  
PANAS_POS  *  EEES_POS  *  primarypsychopathy  .04 (.10) .04 .73  
PANAS_POS  *  EEES_POS  * 
 secondarypsychopathy  -.09 (.09) -.15 .37  
PANAS_POS  *  EEES_POS  *  nback_d_av  -.07 (.10) -.09 .48  
PANAS_POS  *  primarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av  -.14 (.16) -.13 .39  
PANAS_POS  * secondarypsychopathy  * 
 nback_d_av  .01 (.16) .01 .97  
EEES_POS  *  primarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av  -.23 (.13) -.23 .08  
EEES_POS  *  secondarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av  .06 (.17) .05 .73  
PANAS_POS  *  ZEEES_POS  * 
 primarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av  .19 (.13) .19 .16  
PANAS_POS  *  ZEEES_POS  * 
 secondarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av  -.03 (.15) -.21 .87  
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Table 4 Hierarchical linear regression for subscales involving negative emotions. 
 







Block 1     
Sex                .71 (.17) .35 
< .001 
*** .144 *** 
Age                .02 (.02) .11 .19   
Block 2    .167*** 
nBack_Average d' 1 -.08 (.08) -.08 .31  
Primary Psychopathy  -.04 (.09) -.04 .64  
Secondary Psychopathy -.08 (.09) -.08 .39  
PANAS_NEG 2 .01 (.08) .01 .89  
EEES_NEG 3 -.44 (.08) -.42 
< .001 
***   
Block 3    .059 *  
EEES_NEG * PANAS_NEG -.23 (.08) -.23 .01 **  
Secondary Psychopathy * PANAS_NEG .05 (.08) .04 .59  
Primary Psychopathy * PANAS_NEG .03 (.07) .04 .68  
nBack_average d' * PANAS_NEG .11 (.08) .09 .19   
Block 4    .030 
nBack_average d' * Primary Psychopathy * 
PANAS_NEG .03 (.11) .03 .79  
nBack_average d' * Secondary Psychopathy * 
PANAS_NEG -.19 (.11) -.21 .09  
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
1 nBack task (working memory) - average d’ from 2 and 3 back conditions 
2 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Negative 
3 Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale- Negative Emotions 
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nBack_average d' * EEES_NEG * PANAS_NEG .03 (.11) .02 .81  
Primary Psychopathy * EEES_NEG * PANAS_NEG -.03 (.09) -.03 .76  
Secondary Psychopathy * EEES_NEG * 
PANAS_NEG -.11 (.12) -.10 .33  
PANAS_NEG* EEES_NEG * nBack_d_av .03 (.11) .02 .81   
Block 5    0.037 * 
PANAS_NEG  *  EEES_NEG  -.23 (.12) -.23 .05 *  
PANAS_NEG  * primarypsychopathy  -.09 (.09) -.09 .35  
PANAS_NEG  *  secondarypsychopathy .01 (.10) .01 .92  
PANAS_NEG  *  nback_d_av  .19 (.09) .17 .05 *  
EEES_NEG  *  primarypsychopathy  .27 (.14) .21 .05 *  
EEES_NEG  *  secondarypsychopathy -.06 (.12) -.05 .65  
EEES_NEG  *  nback_d_av -.05 (.10) -.04 .66  
primarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av .15 (.09) .16 .11  
secondarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av -.08 (.11) -.09 .41  
PANAS_NEG  *  ZEEES_NEG  * 
 primarypsychopathy .02 (.10) .03 .83  
PANAS_NEG  *  ZEEES_NEG  * 
 secondarypsychopathy -.09 (.13) -.08 .46  
PANAS_NEG  *  ZEEES_NEG  *  nback_d_av -.08 (.12) -.06 .53  
PANAS_NEG  *  primarypsychopathy  * nback_d_av .09 (.12) .09 .43  
PANAS_NEG  *  secondarypsychopathy  * 
 nback_d_av -.22 (.12) -.25 .06  
EEES_NEG  *  primarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av -.02 (.16) -.01 .88  













PANAS_NEG  *  ZEEES_NEG  * 
 primarypsychopathy  *  nback_d_av 
-.34 (.13) -.29     .01 ** 
PANAS_NEG  *  EEES_NEG  * 
 secondarypsychopathy  * nback_d_av .23 (.14) .20 .11  
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Table 5. Hierarchical regressions for individuals scoring low (based on median split) in primary psychopathy. 
 
n = 63 Unstandardized Beta (SE) Standardized Beta Sig Change in R2 
Block 1    .173** 
Sex .91 (.30) .36 .01 **  
Age .03 (.02) .16 .18   
Block 2    .226*** 
Sex .66 (.27) .26 .02 *  
Age .01 (.02) .05 .63  
PANAS_NEG 1 .05 (.11) .05 .65  
nback_d_av 2 -.13 (.11) -.12 .24  
EEES_NEG 3 -.54 (.12) -.48 < .001 ***   
Block 3    .035 
Sex .59 (.28) .23 .04 *  
Age .01 (.02) .04 .71  
PANAS_NEG .00 (.11) .01 .98  
nback_d_av -.14 (.12) -.13 .22  
EEES_NEG -.51 (.13) -.46 < .001 ***  
PANAS_NEG  ✻  nback_d_av .18 (.13) .15 .17  
PANAS_NEG  ✻  EEES_NEG -.09 (.11) -.09 .38  
nback_d_av  ✻  EEES_NEG .04 (.12) .03 .77   
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
1 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Negative Emotions 
2 nBack task (working memory) - average d’ from 2 and 3 back conditions 
3 Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale- Negative Emotions 
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Block 4    .004 
Sex .57 (.28) .23 .05 *  
Age .01 (.02) .04 .66  
PANAS_NEG .01 (.11) .01 .92  
nback_d_av -.16 (.12) -.14 .19  
EEES_NEG -.51 (.13) -.46 < .001 ***  
PANAS_NEG  ✻  nback_d_av .17 (.13) .14 .20  
PANAS_NEG  ✻  EEES_NEG -.13 (.12) -.13 .29  
nback_d_av  ✻  EEES_NEG .04 (.12) .04 .73  
PANAS_NEG  * nback_d_av  * 
 EEES_NEG .09 (.15) .08 .53  
 65 
Table 6. Hierarchical regressions for individuals scoring high (based on median split) in primary psychopathy 
 
n = 63 Unstandardized Beta (SE) Standardized Beta Sig Change in R2 
Block 1    .114 * 
Sex .55 (.21) .32 .01 **  
Age -.05 (.06) -.09 .43   
Block 2    .094 
Sex .35 (.23) .20 .14  
Age -.03 (.06) -.06 .49  
ZPANAS_NEG 1 -.07 (.11) -.07 .55  
Znback_d_av 2 -.03 (.11) -.04 .76  
ZEEES_NEG 3 -.31 (.13) -.32 .02 *   
Block 3    .119 * 
Sex .23 (.22) .13 .31  
Age -.01 (.06) -.02 .85  
PANAS_NEG .08 (.12) .08 .52  
nback_d_av -.03 (.10) -.03 .78  
EEES_NEG -.35 (.12) -.36 .01 **  
PANAS_NEG  ✻  nback_d_av .03 (.11) .03 .79  
PANAS_NEG  ✻  EEES_NEG -.42 (.14) -.38 .01 **  
nback_d_av  ✻  EEES_NEG .08 (.15) .07 .59   
Block 4    .021  
Sex .22 (.22) .13 .33  
 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
1 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Negative 
2 nBack task (working memory) - average d’ from 2 and 3 back conditions 
3 Emotion Experience and Expressive Suppression Scale- Negative Emotions 
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Age < .001 (.06) -.01 .99  
PANAS_NEG .09 (.12) .12 .4  
nback_d_av -.01 (.10) -.02 .89  
EEES_NEG -.33 (.12) -.34 .01 **  
PANAS_NEG  ✻  nback_d_av .04 (.11) .04 .72  
PANAS_NEG  ✻  EEES_NEG -.45 (.14) -.42 .002 **  
nback_d_av  ✻  EEES_NEG .15 (.16) .12 .33  
PANAS_NEG  *  nback_d_av  *  EEES_NEG -.18 (.14) -.16 .20  
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Table 7. Regressions for individuals scoring high (based on median split) in primary psychopathy and low (based on median split) on 
emotional suppression 
 
n = 37 Unstandardized Beta (SE) Standardized Beta Sig Change in R2 
Block 1    .134 
Sex .66 (.29) .35 .03 *  
Age .06 (.15) .07 .66   
Block 2    .018 
Sex .58 (.35) .31 .11  
Age .08 (.15) .08 .59  
PANAS_NEG 1 .15 (.20) .13 .46  








* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
1 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Negative Emotions 
2 nBack task (working memory) - average d’ from 2 and 3 back conditions 
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Table 8. Regressions for individuals scoring high (based on median split) in primary psychopathy and high (based on median split) on 
emotional suppression 
 
n = 24 Unstandardized Beta (SE) Standardized Beta Sig Change in R2 
Block 1    .073 
Sex .02 (.32) .02 .94  
Age -.07 (.06) -.27 .21   
Block 2    .234 * 
Sex .05 (.29) .04 .85  
Age -.07 (.05) -.27 .18  
PANAS_NEG 3 -.26 (.12) -.41 .04 *  






* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
3 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule-Expanded Form- Negative Emotions 
4 nBack task (working memory) - average d’ from 2 and 3 back conditions 
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FIGURES 














1 This example is based on Figure 1, a representation of the n-back task, found in Schwippel et al. (2018). As can be indicated by the brackets above both trials, 
participants are asked to identify if the blocks placement is in an identical location to the block that was seen n-1,2, or 3. While this figure depicts nine locations, 
our version used eight locations (all locations shown above except for center position). 
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Figure 2. Scatterplot of relationship between primary psychopathy severity and working memory performance.2 
 
 
2 Performance on n-back is average of d’ from 2- and 3-back 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of the relationship between frequency of negative emotion experience and strength of negative emotion 
expression for participants with high primary psychopathy and high volitional suppression of negative emotions (n = 25) 
 
 
 
 
